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NUREMBERG AND AMERICAN JUSTICE
MATrHEW LIPPMAN*
Liberty to breathe provided you don't breathe too deeply; liberty to
sleep if your conscience permits it; liberty to work if not too many
questions are asked.... * *
Acts of non-violent civil disobedience have markedly
increased over the past decades. The Nuclear Resister, a tabloid
devoted to the reporting of information on nuclear protests,
states that during the decade of the 1980s nearly 37,000 indi-
viduals were arrested for protest activities. In 1989, the news-
letter recorded an unprecedented amount of anti-nuclear
protest, with 5,500 arrests being made in 145 separate inci-
dents in the United States and Canada. Roughly ninety of the
arrestees received sentences of between two and seventeen
years in prison while hundreds of others received lesser
sentences. 1
Tax resisters and civil disobedients protesting American
foreign and immigration policy and the arms race increasingly
are relying upon international law to justify their formally crim-
inal acts of protest.' Many of these individuals draw analogies
between the moral challenges they confront and those
presented to the citizens of Nazi Germany and derive inspira-
tion from the principles established by the International Mili-
tary Tribunal at Nuremberg.3 The centrality of Nuremberg is
* Ph.D. Northwestern University, J.D. American University, LL.M.
Harvard University, Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice,
University of Illinois at Chicago.
** Kay Boyle, Decision, in THREE SHORT NOVELS 258 (1982), quoted in C.
KOONZ, MOTHERS IN THE FATHERLAND: WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND NAZI
PoLrIcs 318 (1987).
1. Nuclear Resistance 1989, The Nuclear Resister, Jan 25, 1990, at 1, col.
1. Arrests totaled 4,470 in 1988; 5,300 in 1987; 3,200 in 1986; 3,300 in 1985;
and 3,010 in 1983. Id. See generally Lippman, First Strike Nuclear Weapons and
the Justiciability of Civil Resistance Under International Law, 2 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
LJ. 155 (1989).
2. See generally F.A. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
3. See R.M. BROWN, Biblical Concepts of Idolatry, in SANCTUARY: A
RESOURCE GUIDE FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN REFUGEES' STRUGGLE 55, 61 (G. MacEoin ed. 1985).
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indicated by the fact that various peace groups have labelled
their protests as "Nuremberg Actions."4
These groups have drawn a comparison between the
necessity of halting the manufacturing and transporting of
nuclear weapons or arms destined for Central America and the
trains which transported Jews to death camps. As righteous
individuals the members of these groups believe they are obli-
gated to sacrifice themselves in order to bear witness to and to
halt what they perceive as immoral and illegal activities. 5 Vari-
ous professional organizations have voted to adopt "Nurem-
berg Pledges." In 1985, the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers expressed their concern over the inci-
dence of State-sponsored crime and the threat of nuclear war.6
They pledged to work in their professional roles as citizens to
combat these evils and to establish an international legal frame-
work to assure the deliberate and impartial application of the
Nuremberg Principles.7
Those who rely upon international law to justify their pro-
tests refer to their acts as civil resistance rather than as civil
disobedience.' Civil disobedience, as classically defined, is
undertaken in accordance with a number of strictures intended
to minimize the social disruption resulting from such actions,
and designed to emphasize that the disobedient is opposed to a
particular law rather than to the entire political system.9 Indi-
viduals, if possible, should violate the specific law to which they
object and should do so in an open, non-violent fashion, plead
guilty and accept their punishment. Disobedients believe that
the use of force will lead to an escalating cycle of violence and
distract attention from the focus of the protest. Because there
inevitably is uncertainty concerning the validity of a protester's
views, the infliction of harm on others cannot be justified.
There is thought to be a close relationship between means and
ends and the use of violence also institutionalizes force as a
mode of dispute resolution. In addition, violence is viewed as
4. See Attempted Murder, GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 1989, at 1, 7.
5. See generally PRISONERS ON PURPOSE: A PEACEMAKERS' GUIDE TO JAILS
AND PRISONS (S. Day ed. 1989).
6. The Nuremberg Pledge of Lawyers and Jurists, in SWORDS INTO
PLOWSHARES: NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION FOR DISARMAMENT 209 (A.J. Laffin
& A. Montgomery eds. 1987). The International Association of Democratic
Lawyers is an international association of socialist lawyers.
7. Id.
8. See generally F.A. BOYLE, supra note 2.
9. This discussion of civil disobedience is based upon Lippman, Civil
Disobedience: The Dictates of Conscience Versus the Rule of Law, 26 WASHBURN L.J.
233 (1967).
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reducing people to impersonal objects, which is inconsistent
with respect for the individuality and equality of all individuals
and with the very humanitarian values which disobedients seek
to promote.
A central precept of civil disobedience is that the dis-
obedients plead guilty and accept their punishment in order to
indicate the depth of their commitment to their cause and in
order to symbolize their willingness to suffer for their beliefs.
This demonstrates protesters' belief in and respect for the legal
system and is a manifestation of the fact that protesters object
to a particular law rather than to the entire legal system. By
pleading guilty and accepting their punishment, protesters
minimize the possibility that others will be encouraged by their
example to arbitrarily disregard the law. Since the Socratic
argument benefits from the opportunities presented by a soci-
ety, a moral person would be acting unjustly if he or she
claimed exemption from societal laws and obligation.
Civil disobedience is criticized as profoundly undemocratic
in that disobedients are alleged to rely upon coercion and
intimidation to achieve their goals. However, civil disobedi-
ence, is based upon a supreme belief in the power of democ-
racy in that it is an attempt to appeal to and to mobilize public
opinion and sentiment behind the disobedients' cause. To the
extent that disobedients violate the law in order to provide for
judicial review of the statutes under which they have been
indicted, they are helping to insure that existing laws conform
to constitutional principles.
Civil resisters accept civil disobedients' basic commitment
to non-violence, but base their objections on both morality and
international law. Civil resisters claim that they are engaged in
legally justifiable acts of protes t designed to prevent the gov-
ernment's ongoing commission of acts which are in violation of
international criminal law. In this effort, civil resisters typically
violate various property laws which only are indirectly related
to the motivation for their actions. Civil resisters typically
plead not guilty and attempt to offer an international law
defense based upon the Nuremberg precedent.'
10. This defense often is presented indirectly through reliance on
traditional common law defenses such as necessity. See Lippman, The Necessity
Defense And Political Protest, 26 CRIM. L. BuLL. 317 (1990). In my experience in
civil resistance cases involving Central America, South Africa and nuclear
weapons, the defense typically offers to present expert witnesses who
elaborate upon and support the reasonableness of the resisters' view that the
State conduct being challenged is violative of international law. Other
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These protesters thus prefer to view themselves as
engaged in acts ofjustified civil resistance rather than in acts of
concededly criminal civil disobedience. By denying their guilt,
civil resisters implicitly display a deep cynicism concerning the
government. The government is not merely a benign but occa-
sionally misguided enterprise. It is an institution that is capa-
ble of intentionally engaging in illegitimate criminal conduct.
In such circumstances, it would be ingenuous for resisters pas-
sively to plead guilty and to accept the punishment meted out.
By seeking to offer a defense, resisters are symbolically distanc-
ing themselves from the activities of the government and are
promoting the primacy of the rule of law. Their trial provides
them with the opportunity to focus public attention on the pat-
tern and impact of governmental illegality and to obtain an
independent evaluation of the justiciability of their conduct
from a jury of their peers. American appellate courts, however,
generally have rejected the so-called Nuremberg defense on
the grounds that defendants lack standing to raise such
defenses and that the introduction of such defenses would vio-
late the political question doctrine. The judiciary, in essence,
refuses to permit defendants to rely upon criminal defenses
which indirectly require the adjudication of the legality of
United States foreign and national security policies."
This essay outlines the basic principles established by the
Nuremberg Tribunal and by other post-war Allied war crimes
trials and argues that these precedents establish a legal privi-
lege for individuals to violate domestic law in order to prevent
governmental policies and actions which are reasonably
believed to be in violation of international criminal law. In
conclusion, the essay argues that the Nuremberg Principles
have been recognized as part of the corpus of international law
and, as such, are binding on the United States judiciary and
should be recognized, on the grounds of both policy and law,
as forming the basis for a valid defense in domestic criminal
trials.
witnesses attest to the historic role of civil disobedience in bringing about
social change.
11. See Lippman, supra note 9, at 248-49. Civil resisters, despite their
view that the government is engaged in widespread and persistent activity in
violation of international law, appear to retain a faith in the judiciary and in
the independent authority of the rule of law.
NUREMBERG AND AMERICAN JUSTICE
I. THE NUREMBERG JUDGMENT AND PRINCIPLES
Following World War II, the Allied Powers resolved to
prosecute the major Nazi war criminals before a multinational
tribunal.' 2 During the drafting of the Nuremberg Charter at
the London Conference of 1945, United States Supreme Court
Justice Robert H. Jackson stated that the Allies intended to
prosecute "the planners, the zealots who put this thing
across. . . . [t]he emphasis should be on the planning level
rather than on the mere fact that at some point one voluntarily
or involuntarily, knowingly or unknowingly, participated in car-
rying it out."'" The trial of Nazi leaders was viewed as central
in helping to create a post-war order based upon democracy,
justice and the rule of law.'
4
Twenty-two defendants were prosecuted at Nuremberg
and were variously indicted and convicted for Crimes against
Peace (waging aggressive war),' 5 War Crimes,'" and Crimes
12. Minutes of Conference Session of July 16, 1945 (Document XXX), in
REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 246, 250-51 (1945)
[hereinafter REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON]. For a full discussion of the
Nuremberg trial, see Lippman, Nuremberg, 6 LAW IN CONTEXT 20 (1980).
13. Minutes of Conference Session of July 24, 1945 (Document XLVII), in
REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON at 360, 363.
14. American Memorandum Presented at San Francisco, Apr. 30, 1945, in
REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON at 28, 34-35.
15. XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 461-68 (1947) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS]. Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter defines
Crimes against Peace:
(a) Crimes against peace: Namely, planning, preparation, initiation
or waging of a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284,
reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (Supp. 1945) art. 6(a) [hereinafter Nurem-
berg Charter], cited in Lippman, Reflections On Non-Violent Resistance And The
Necessity Defense, 11 Hous. J. INr'L L. 277, 284 n.59 (1989).
16. XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 15, at 496-98.
Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter defines War Crimes:
(b) War Crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war.
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-
treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 15, at art. 6(b).
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against Humanity.17In retrospect, perhaps the most significant
aspect of the Nuremberg judgment is that it established indi-
vidual liability for acts violative of international law. 8
The Tribunal stated that violations of international law
"are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provi-
sions of international law be enforced."1 9 The Tribunal, in rul-
ing that these international obligations take precedence over
the demands of domestic law, observed that "very essence of
the Charter is that individuals have international duties which
transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the
individual state."2 The Tribunal also abrogated the act of
state doctrine which provides immunity from legal liability in
foreign and international courts to government officials. It
pronounced that individuals "cannot obtain immunity while
acting in pursuance of the authority of the state, if the state in
authorizing action moves outside its competence under inter-
national law."''  In addition, the Tribunal rejected the superior
orders defense for crimes under the Charter, ruling that supe-
rior orders only may be considered in mitigation of
punishment.
22
The Tribunal thus extended international criminal liability
to individuals, narrowed the superior orders defense and
rejected the act of state defense. This far-reaching extension of
international criminal liability to individuals, however, is in
stark contrast to the Tribunal's restrictive definition of the ele-
ments of the substantive offenses punishable under the Char-
ter. This narrow definition of the substantive offenses had the
effect of limiting criminal liability to the Nazi leadership cadre
17. XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 15, at 498.
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter defines Crimes against Humanity:
(c) Crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 15, at art. 6(c).
18. T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 82
(1970).
19. XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 15, at 466.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The Tribunal also ruled that the test for superior orders is not
the existence of an order, but whether a "moral choice was in fact possible."
NUREMBERG AND AMERICAN JUSTICE
which was directly responsible for planning, implementing and
waging Germany's wars of aggression.
Count One charged the defendants with involvement in a
common plan or conspiracy to wage an aggressive war.23 The
Tribunal adopted a narrow definition of conspiracy which lim-
ited liability to those high echelon officials who were present at
planning sessions for wars of aggression.24 In its judgment, the
Tribunal required that the conspiracy must be "clearly outlined
in its criminal purpose; "25 it "must not be too far removed
from the time of decision and of action; "26 and a "concrete
plan" to wage war must have existed.
27
-Count Three punished war crimes. 28 In order to sustain a
conviction under this count, the Tribunal appears to have
required that the evidence "sufficiently connect[ed]" a defend-
ant with the planning, ordering, inciting or commission of war
crimes.29 Mere knowledge or communication of orders or the
proposal of discriminatory laws was not sufficient tosupport a
conviction.3" The Tribunal also was reluctant to impose liabil-
ity on German leaders for acts Which also had been engaged in
by the Allied Powers.3 ' In the explanation- 1f its judgment,
the Tribunal did not clearly distinguish between those acts
which comprised War Crimes and those- which constituted
Crimes against Humanity and the verdicts on Counts Three
and Four were identical.3 2 The Tribunal narrowed the scope of
Crimes against Humanity by limiting its jurisdiction over such
23. XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 15, at 467-69.
24. Id. at 467-68.
25. Id. at 467.
26. Id.
27. Id. Count Two, participation in the planning, preparation, initiation
and waging of an aggressive war served to convict some of the defendants
acquitted on the narrowly-drawn conspiracy charge. These defendants had
helped to formulate and direct Nazi military tactics and occupation plans. Id.
at 544-76. Those acquitted on Count One who were convicted on Count
Two include Frick, Id. at 544-47; Funk, Id. at 549-52; Donitz, Id. at 556-60;
and Seyss-Inquart, Id. at 574-76.
28. Id. at 469-97.
29. Id. at 529.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 558-59. The Tribunal acquitted Donitz of the war crime
charge of waging unrestricted submarine warfare. Id. at 559. It took judicial
notice of the fact that the British Admiralty had adopted a similar policy in
the Skageraak at night, and practiced unrestricted submarine warfare in the
Pacific. Although Donitz was convicted of War Crimes, the Tribunal
emphasized that, as a matter of equity, "the sentence of Donitz is not
assessed on the grounds of his breach of the international law of submarine
warfare." Id. at 559.
32. See id. at 496-98, 524-87.
19911
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crimes to those which had occurred subsequent to 1939.33
Although the Tribunal took notice of the fact that the Nazi's
persecution of civilians prior to 1939 was ruthlessly carried out,
the Tribunal ruled that such repression was not carried out in
execution of, or in connection with either a Crime against
Peace or a War Crime and thus did not constitute a Crime
against Humanity within the meaning of the Nuremberg Char-
ter.3 4 Acts of persecution, repression and murder committed
against civilians prior to 1939 thus were ruled to be outside the
Tribunal's jurisdiction in that they were not considered to have
been committed in connection with another crime punishable
by the Nuremberg Charter."5
Article Nine of the Charter declared that the Tribunal had
the discretion to declare (in connection with any act of which
an individual may be convicted under the Charter) that a group
or organization was a criminal organization under the Nurem-
berg Charter.36 The Tribunal determined that such a criminal
organization must be bound together for a common purpose
and must have been formed or used in connection with crimes
punished under'the Charter.37 It ruled that mere membership
in such an organization was not sufficient to constitute criminal
behavior.38
The Tribunal limited liability to those voluntary members
who had specific knowledge of the organization's criminal pur-
poses or acts of the organization and to those conscripted
members who were personally implicated in the commission of
criminal acts under the Charter." In addition, the Tribunal
thus limited its declarations of criminality to those coherent
organizations whose members were directly and consistently
involved in the commission of crimes under the Charter.4" The
33. Id. at 498.
34. Id. The Tribunal offered an ambiguous distinction between War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. It explained that in so far as inhumane
acts were committed in execution of, or in connection with, an aggressive
war and did not constitute War Crimes, they constituted Crimes against
Humanity. Id.
35. Id.
36. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 15, at art. 9.
37. Id. at art. 10.
38. XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 15, at 500.
39. Id.
40. Id. Declarations of criminality were issued against the Leadership
Corps (administrative branch) of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo (internal
political police), the SD (intelligence agency of the security police) and the SS
(internal security police). Id. at 501-17. The Tribunal declined to issue such
declarations against the SA (Nazi Party militia), the Reich Cabinet and the
German General Staff and High Command. Id. at 517-23.
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Tribunal was thus reluctant to expansively interpret the provi-
sions of the Charter punishing membership in criminal organi-
zations, explaining that criminal guilt is personal and that mass
punishment should be avoided.4 '
Thus the Nuremberg Tribunal generally limited the scope
of liability under the Charter to high echelon officials who
directly planned, ordered and implemented criminal acts. As a
result, Nazi atrocities and aggressions were portrayed implicitly
as the acts of those with "brains and authority"4 and of "sta-
tion and rank"4 who did not soil their "hands with blood."44
They "were men who knew how to use lesser folks as tools....
[they were] planners and designers, the inciters and leaders
without whose evil architecture the world would not have been
for so long scourged with the violence and lawlessness, and
racked with the agonies and convulsions, of this terrible war.
'45
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg did not
directly address the criminal liability of those below the policy
level.
In the Flick case,46 however, a United States Military Tribu-
nal rejected the argument that international law "is a matter
wholly outside the work, interest and knowledge of private
individuals."' 47 The Tribunal emphasized that international law
binds every citizen just as municipal law. Acts "adjudged crimi-
nal when done by an officer of the Government are criminal
also when done by a private individual;" their guilt "differs
only in magnitude, not in quality."' 48 In another post-World
War II war crimes trial, a British military court affirmed that
"the provisions of the laws and customs of war are addressed
not only to combatants and to members of state and other pub-
lic authorities, but to anybody who is in a position to assist in
their violation."
49
Despite these expansive statements pertaining to the scope
of individual liability under international law and the observa-
tions of prosecutors that Hitler, of necessity, relied upon others
41. Id.
42. II TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 15, at 104
(opening argument of Justice Jackson of the United States).
43. Id. at 105.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The Flick Trial, 9 L. Rep. Trials War Crim. I (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n American Mil. Trib., Nuremberg, Germany 1947).
47. Id. at 18.
48. Id.
49. Zyklon B Case, I L. Rep. Trials War Crim. 93, 103 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n Brit. Mil. Ct. Hamburg, Germany 1945).
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to execute his plans;50 and that "the guilt of Germany will not
be erased for the people of Germany share it in large mea-
sure," 51 post-Nuremberg Allied war crimes tribunals remained
reluctant to extend criminal liability below the policy-making
level.5  The Tribunal in the I.G. Farben Trial5 noted that the
extension of liability below the policy-making level "would lead
far afield."5 4 There could be no "practical limitation on crimi-
nal responsibility that would not include, on principle, the pri-
vate soldier on the battlefield, the farmer who increased his
production of foodstuffs to sustain the armed forces, or the
housewife who conserved fats for the making of munitions. 55
Under these circumstances, the Tribunal noted that "the entire
manpower of Germany could, at the uncontrolled discretion of
the indicting authorities, be held to answer for Waging wars of
aggression. That would indeed result in the possibility of mass
punishments."
5 6
Judge Anderson warned, in his concurring opinion in the
Krupp Trial,57 that this would lead to the unprecedented impo-
sition of collective guilt upon ordinary civilians for the criminal
actions of their government. 58 He noted that the extension of
criminal liability below the policy-making level would mean, in
the future, that ordinary citizens would be required to deter-
mine, at their peril, whether the war in which they were
required or requested to participate or to support was legally
justified.59 Under the heat of the moment, the private citizen
thus would have to weigh the relevant facts and law and make
the unhappy choice between loyalty to their country and adher-
ence to international law.60 Judge Anderson further argued
that given the ambiguity of international law that this would
impose a particularly heavy burden on citizens. 6'
50. XIX TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 15, at 430
(closing argument of Justice Jackson).
51. Id. at 434 (closing argument of Hartley Shawcross, United Kingdom
prosecutor).
52. See The I.G. Farben Trial, X L. Rep. Trials War Crim. 1, 38-9 (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n, American Mil. Trib., Nuremberg, Germany 1948).
53. Id. at 1.
54. Id. at 38.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The Krupp Trial, X L. Rep. Trial War Grim. 69, 109 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, American Mil. Trib., Nuremberg, Germany 1948)
(concurring opinion of Presiding Judge H.G. Anderson).
58. Id. at 128.
59. Id.
60. The I.G. Farben Trial, supra note 52, at 39.
61. The Krupp Trial, supra note 57, at 128.
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Underlying this reluctance to extend criminal liability for
war crimes below the policy-making level was the belief that the
great mass of the German people had been exposed to Nazi
propaganda and had little, if any, knowledge of the criminal
activities' of the totalitarian Third Reich.62 Those who were
informed of the barbarities committed by the Nazis who dared
to protest were severely repressed.6 3 In addition, the Western
Powers had the practical consideration that widespread war
crimes trials would create animosity and further destabilize
German society, and would prevent the creation of a strong
German bulwark against Soviet expansionism. Further, many
lower-level Nazi operatives possessed valuable skills and intelli-
gence concerning communist activities and were viewed as
potentially important additions to the Western Powers' security
apparatus .64
Despite the fact that World War II war crimes tribunals did
not impose legal liability upon ordinary Germans, Germans
certainly had the legal privilege under international law to act
in a non-violent proportionate fashion to halt the commission
of war crimes. This privilege is inherent within the Nuremberg
Principles. Otherwise, international law, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, would condemn acts in violation of the Nuremberg Char-
ter while countenancing the punishment of those who act to
prevent the commission of such crimes. In fact, those who
prosecuted or convicted individuals who attempted to shelter
Jews and other victims of the Nazi's genocidal policies were
themselves guilty of war crimes.65
This "Nuremberg privilege" is merely an extension of the
principle recognized by Anglo-American common and statu-
tory law that an individual has the privilege to intervene to halt
the commission of a crime. Under Anglo-American law, the
intervener is permitted to employ deadly force to prevent the
commission of a crime likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm. It thus cannot be denied that this same privilege permits
individuals to engage in non-violent proportionate acts entail-
ing minor violations of regulatory statutes in order to prevent
the commission of the type of mass crimes of destruction pun-
ishable under the Nuremberg Charter.66 Nuremberg then
62. XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 15, at 423.
63. Id.
64. See generally Lippman, The Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals in the
United States: Is Justice Being Served?, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169, 173-77 (1985).
65. The Justice Trial, 4 L. Rep. Trials War Crim. 1, 49 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n American Mil. Trib. Nuremberg, Germany 1947).
66. See Campbell, The Nuremberg Defense to Charges of Domestic Crime: A
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serves both as a sword which can be used to prosecute war
criminals, and as a shield for those who are compelled to engage
in conscientious acts of moral protest against illegal wars and
methods of warfare.67
Americans have even a more compelling privilege to act to
prevent war crimes than did Germans under the Third Reich.
Americans generally have the ability to inform themselves as to
their government's activities and do not face savage repression
if they protest. Given the variety of media outlets in America,
protests may influence a significant audience and potentially
may serve as a catalyst for social reform. In addition, United
States foreign and defense policies, at times, have a profoundly
negative impact upon peoples throughout the globe, many of
whom have little capacity or ability to influence their own gov-
ernment, let alone American policy-makers. American citizens
thus have a unique ability, and consequent responsibility, to
lobby and to work on behalf of these largely invisible and voice-
less peoples throughout the world.
II. THE NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES AND INTERNATIONAL AND
AMERICAN DOMESTIC LAW
The United Nations has affirmed and elaborated upon the
Nuremberg Principles on countless occasions.68 For instance,
in 1946, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously
affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the
Tribunal. 69 Then, in 1947, the United Nations General Assem-
bly requested the International Law Commission to formulate a
Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind which incorporated the Nuremberg Principles. 70 The
Code, which has yet to be adopted, elaborates upon the crimes
punishable under the Nuremberg Charter and imposes individ-
ual responsibility for such acts upon governmental officials as
well as upon ordinary citizens.
7'
Non-Traditional Approach for Nuclear-Arms Protestors, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 93,
114 (1986).
67. Falk, The Circle of Responsibility, in CRIMES Or WAR 222, 229 (R.A.
Falk, G. Kolko & R.J. Lifton eds. 1971).
68. See Lippman, supra note 64, at 208-09.
69. G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/236 at 1144 (1946), quoted and cited in
Patterson, The Principles of Nuremberg as a Defense to Civil Disobedience, 72 Mo. L.
REV. 33, 37 n.26 (1972).
70. G.A. Res. 177(11), U.N. Doc. A/505 at 1280 (1947), quoted and cited
in id. at 37, n.27.
71. Int'l L. Comm'n Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
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Professor Cherif Bassiouni concludes that the Nuremberg
Principles are "part of the general principles of international
law, and, as such, constitute one of the sources of international
law as stated in Article 38 of the International Court of Jus-
tice.-' 2 Professor Bassiouni's view has been supported by vari-
ous commentators7" who agree that given the widespread
international support for the Nuremberg Principles, their
unanimous adoption by resolution of the United Nations, and
their incorporation by statute into the domestic law of several
nations, that "there is a strong argument that they are part of
customary international law."
'7 4
The Nuremberg Principles thus are not a "one-shot
affair," but are part of international law which, in turn, is part
of the domestic law of the United States.75 Article VI, para-
graph 2 of the United States Constitution provides that the
rules of international law as embodied in treaties entered into
pursuant to the sovereign authority of the United States of
America are part of the supreme law of the land.7 6 The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that both the principles
of positive treaty and customary international law are binding
on the United States and are to be applied by United States
courts.7 7 William O'Brien concludes that "the totality of inter-
national practice adds up to the conclusion that the Nuremberg
[P]rinciples are binding on the United States as a result of cus-
tomary international practice."7 O'Brien goes on to note that
Security of Mankind, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/1858, at 10-14
(1951) cited and quoted in Id. at 37 n.28, reprinted in Komarow, Individual
Responsibility Under International Law: The Nuremberg Principles in Domestic Legal
Systems, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 21, 36-37 (1980).
72. Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
202, 235 (1979). See generally Statute of the International Court of Justice,
Article 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. no. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 U.N.Y.B.
1052 (done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945)(entered into force for the
United States, Oct. 24, 1945).
73. See Kaufman,Judgment at Nuremberg-An Appraisal of its Significance, 40
GUILD PRAC. 62, 79 (1983).
74. Lawrence, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 397, 408 (1989).
75. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials and Objection to Military Service in Viet-
Nam, 63 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 140, 167 (1969).
76. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
77. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); Lopes v. Schroeder,
225 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
78. O'Brien, Selective Conscientious Objection and International Law, 56 GEO.
L.J. 1080, 1092 (1968). The Nuremberg Principles also are binding on the
United States as an executive agreement entered into by the executive
branch. See Lawrence, supra note 74, at 405-06. See generally United States v.
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the United States has endorsed the Nuremberg Principles on
numerous occasions; 79 is a signatory to various agreements
regulating the law of war which are inspired by and based upon
Nuremberg; 0 and has incorporated the Nuremberg Principles
into its law of land and naval warfare. 8 t
Telford Taylor, who served as chief counsel for the prose-
cution at Nuremberg, writes that at the conclusion of the
Nuremberg trial, America "stood legally, politically and mor-
ally committed to the principles enunciated in the charters and
judgments of the tribunals. ", 82 He concludes that "the integrity
of the nation" is staked on continued adherence to these prin-
ciples which were not limited to those prosecuted at Nurem-
berg, but were intended to apply to all individuals, regimes and
States which may violate them in the future.8" Justice Jackson
emphasized in his opening address at the Nuremberg trial that:
[T]he ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are
inevitable in a system of international lawlessness, is to
make statesmen responsible to law. And let me make
clear that while this law is first applied against German
aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful
purpose it must condemn aggression by any other
nations, including those which sit here now in judgment.
We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and vio-
lence and aggression by those in power against the rights
of their own people only when we make all men answer-
able to the law.
84
Despite the status of the Nuremberg Principles as part of
customary international law which is constitutionally incorpo-
rated into United States law, American courts have refused to
permit defendants to invoke the Nuremberg Principles as a
defense to criminal charges stemming from politically-inspired
acts of criminal protest.8 5 The judiciary has based their rejec-
tion of the so-called Nuremberg defense (eg. the claim that
individuals are privileged, if not compelled, under interna-
tional law to halt governmental acts reasonably believed to be
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 221-26 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
330 (1937).
79. O'Brien, supra note 78, at 1092.
80. Id. at 1093.
81. Id. at 1093-94.
82. T. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 94.
83. Id.
84. 11 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 15, at 154.
85. See Komarow, Individual Responsibility Under International Law: The
Nuremberg Principles in Domestic Legal Systems, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 21 (1980).
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in violation of the Nuremberg Principles) on the standing and
political question doctrines.86
In the seminal case of United States v. Berrigan,87 District
Court Judge Northrop ruled that the defendants lacked stand-
ing to raise the Nuremberg defense to justify their destruction
of Vietnam draft records. Judge Northrop reasoned that the
defendants were ordinary civilians who were not in danger of
incurring liability under the Nuremberg Principles and thus
had no legal duty to resist specific acts which they reasonably
believed to be in violation of the Nuremberg Charter.88 In
United States v. Kabat,89 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
observed that it would be a "great extension" of Nuremberg to
hold that persons who "remained passive, neither aiding nor
opposing their governments' international violations, were war
criminals merely by virtue of their citizenship or residence in
given countries."90 The court concluded that since ordinary
citizens incur no legal liability under Nuremberg they can claim
no privilege to violate domestic law in order to exculpate their
guilt.9 ' In United States v. Montgomery,92 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals observed that civil disobedients stand
Nuremberg "on its head in arguing that a person charged with
no duty or responsibility by domestic law may voluntarily vio-
late a criminal law and claim that violation was required to
avoid liability under international law."9 Thus, United States
courts have denied standing to individuals to raise the Nurem-
berg defense in cases such as Berrigan, Kabat and Montgomery,
where the defendants are unable to demonstrate a specific
86. Lawrence, supra note 74, at 417. See generally Colbert, The Motion in
Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 1271 (1987).
87. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd sub
norm., United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 909 (1970).
88. Id. at 341. Standing is a procedural requirement designed to insure
that a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to
obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. In part, it is based on the
interest in having a case presented in an adversarial context by a party to
whom proper judicial relief can be granted. In practice, it permits courts to
avoid frivolous suits, advisory opinions, and unnecessary litigation. See
generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
89. United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1986).
90. Id. at 590.
91. Id. See also United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir. 1985).
92. United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733, 738 (11 th Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 738.
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injury or duty distinguishable from that of the general
citizenry.94
The judiciary also has refused to recognize the standing of
members of the armed forces in wartime to raise the Nurem-
berg defense. In State v. Marley,95 the Supreme Court of Hawaii
held that a member of the United States Navy did not have the
legal duty to criminally trespass on and to occupy the premises
of the Honeywell Corporation in order to protest and to halt
the corporation's activities in Vietnam which he believed con-
stituted war crimes under the Nuremberg Charter.96 The
Court ruled that "mere membership" in the Armed Forces
does not "under any circumstances" create criminal liability
under the Nuremberg Principles.97 In Switkes v. Laird,9" the dis-
trict court ruled that even if the war in Indochina was being
conducted in violation of both domestic and international law,
a medical officer specializing in psychiatry was not entitled to a
preliminary injunction restraining his transfer to Vietnam.99
The Court ruled that it was unlikely that the defendant would
be required to engage in acts violative of the Nuremberg Char-
ter and that an individual's mere military service in Vietnam did
not make them an accomplice to war crimes."°
In addition to defendants' lack of standing to raise the
Nuremberg defense, courts have ruled that the introduction of
such a defense is prohibited by the political question doctrine.
In Berrigan, the District Court ruled that the question whether
the deployment of United States troops abroad is in compli-
ance with international law "is a question which necessarily
must be left to the elected representatives of the people and
not to the judiciary."' ' The court denied that this was an
"abdication of responsibility" and reasoned that the political
question doctrine was a recognition that the decision whether
to commit troops in combat "should be assumed by that level
of government which under the Constitution and international
law is authorized to commit the nation."'
02
94. See United States v. May, 622 F.2d at 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1980).
95. State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973).
96. Id. at 452-53, 509 P.2d at 1099.
97. Id. at 475, 509 P.2d at 1110-11. See also United States v. Valentine,
288 F. Supp. 957, 986-87 (D. P.R. 1968).
98. Switkes v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
99. Id. at 365.
100. Id.
101. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. at 342.
102. Id. The contemporary political question doctrine appears to
involve three inquiries: (1) Whether the Court is required to resolve
questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of
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In Farmer v. Roundtree lO two taxpayers claimed the right
under international law to refuse payment of two-thirds of their
income taxes. They alleged the taxes were being illegally
appropriated by Congress pursuant to a conspiracy to prepare
for and to wage an illegal aggressive war of world domina-
tion." The District Court emphasized that the foreign policy
of the United States is the "exclusive province" of the execu-
tive and legislative branches and that the courts should refrain
from rendering any judgment which would "embarrass the pol-
icy decisions of government or involve them in confusion and
uncertainty."' 5 The court observed that it lacked the exper-
tise to gather and to evaluate the relevant facts and that pro-
longed litigation would disrupt the policy-making process.
0 6
In sum, courts have refused to permit the courthouse to be
used as a forum for the articulation of political opposition to
governmental policies by criminal defendants who cannot
allege a judicially cognizable concrete injury. Such individuals
have been held to lack standing to challenge government poli-
cies in a civil suit,' 0 7 and courts have refused to permit them to
"skirt the standing requirement by intentionally breaking an
unrelated law in order to cast themselves as defendants rather
than plaintiffs."' 0' In the end, the judiciary has taken the posi-
tion that to permit the public order to be disrupted "under the
aegis of international law would foment an anarchical
result."' 0' 9 They have found no support for the proposition
that a free and democratic society "must excuse violation of its
laws by those seeking to conform their country's policies to
international law. Compliance with international law must be
sought through the ballot box, or where appropriate, by court
government? (2) Whether the Court is required to decide questions which
are beyond its expertise? (3) Whether prudential considerations mandate
against judicial intervention? See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
103. Farmer v. Roundtree, 149 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), aff'd
per cur/am, 252 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1958).
104. Id. at 328.
105. Id. at 329.
106. Id.
107. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 216-28 (1973).
108. United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 453 (1985).
109. People v. Weber, 162 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 6, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719,
722 (1984).
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action."' 1 As the Seventh Circuit observed in United States v.
Cullen: I
One who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into
his own hands thereby demonstrates his conviction that
his own ability to determine policy is superior to demo-
cratic decision making. Appellant's professed unselfish
motivation, rather than a justification, actually identified
a form of arrogance which organized society cannot
tolerate. 112
Although judges purport to view acts of civil resistance as
'common crimes," they have meted out particularly harsh
sentences to such defendants.' In State v. Wentworth," 4 the
New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed a sentence of six
months imprisonment and a two months suspended sentence
for a first time offender convicted of criminal trespass at a
nuclear power plant . 5 The court reasoned that a severe sen-
tence was required in order to convince the highly educated
and motivated defendant to utilize lawful means of protest.'1
In United States v. Kabat," 7 the defendants, including two
priests, received criminal sentences ranging from eight to
eighteen years in prison for having entered a missile silo and
chipping the missile lids with a jackhammer. They also poured
blood on the silo, draped it with peace banners and prayed." "
Judge Bright, in his dissent," 9 observed that the defendants'
activities did not injure anyone and did not damage the mis-
sile's capability. He admonished the court that the sentences
were "akin to penalties often imposed on violent criminals,
such as robbers and rapists, or on those guilty of crimes consid-
ered heinous, such as drug dealers."'
20
110. In re Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d 44, 49, 210 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133
(1985).
111. United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971).
112. Id. at 392.
113. See 622 F.2d at 1009-10.
114. State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 395 A.2d 858 (1978).
115. Id. at 841-42, 395 A.2d at 864.
116. Id. at 841-42, 395 A.2d at 865.
117. 797 F.2d at 580.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 592.
120. Id. at 594.
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III. TOWARDS THE RECOGNITION OF A DOMESTIC
NUREMBERG DEFENSE
The United States was central in the drafting of the
Nuremberg Charter, in organizing the Nuremberg trials and in
prosecuting Nazi war criminals. It also performed a leading.
role in gaining United Nations adoption of the Nuremberg
Principles and in constructing a post-war order based upon the
rule of international law. Yet, when confronted by criminal
defenses based upon the Nuremberg Principles, the American
appellate judiciary, which is constitutionally required to respect
and to apply international law, has denied defendants standing,
has invoked the political question doctrine and has refused to
evaluate the legality of American foreign and defense policies.
The judiciary's refusal to permit defendants to rely upon the
Nuremberg defense may be motivated by a desire to insulate
itself from being drawn into political conflicts with the execu-
tive and legislative branches. However, in the process of
attempting to preserve its neutrality,, the judiciary implicitly
endorses and legitimates the foreign policy decisions of the
political branches of government and abdicates its responsibil-
ity to insure that the government adheres to the rule of interna-
tional law. This results in a foreign policy which, while
symbolically adhering to the rule of law, in fact, is largely unre-
strained by meaningful legal review.' 2 '
Contemporary international law is intended to constrain,
rather than to justify, the self-interested behavior of states.
American courts must recognize that they are designed, in part,
to protect and to serve people and they are not the exclusive
preserve of states. Domestic courts, cognizant of the fact that
international institutions provide inadequate mechanisms for
the enforcement of international law, must move towards a rec-
ognition of a people's international law devoted to the preser-
vation of a fragile global order. Threats such as ecocide,
genocide and a nuclear holocaust require the vigorous invoca-
tion of the Nuremberg Defense by an alert and aggressive citi-
zenry. Those who are attempting to non-violently compel the
United States government to adhere to international law
should be recognized as heroes who are to be emulated rather
than as criminals who are to be confined. Ironically, it is the
criminal courts, so often reviled as agents of repression, which
121. See generally Boyle, International Law, Citizen Resistance, and Crimes by
the State-The Defense Speaks, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 345 (1989).
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possess the constitutional discretion to recognize the Nurem-
berg Defense and help to preserve the sanctity of human life.' 22
Although the United States was founded by an act of polit-
ical rebellion and revolutionary violence, there is a common
faith that justice and equality can be achieved through the
operation of the political process. 2 ' Unfortunately, however,
citizens often lack the resources and sophistication necessary to
influence the political process; and the government has not
always been tolerant of its critics. Another letter always can be
written, an additional politician lobbied and more demonstra-
tions organized. It should be sufficient to raise the Nuremberg
defense that an individual is able to demonstrate good faith
efforts to achieve social reform.
12
The admonition that protesters have not exhausted their
legal alternatives overlooks the fact that historically citizens
have been forced to resort to extra-legal means of expression
in order to achieve social reform. Judge Bright, dissenting in
Kabat, observed that:
We must recognize that civil disobedience in various
forms, used without violent acts against others, is
engrained in our society and the moral correctness of
political protesters' views has on occasion served to
change and better our society. Civil disobedience has
been prevalent throughout this nation's history
extending from the Boston Tea Party and the signing of
the Declaration of Independence, to the freeing of the
slaves by operation of the underground railroad in the
mid-1800's [sic]. More recently, disobedience of "Jim
Crow" laws served, among other things, as a catalyst to
end segregation by law in this country, and violation of
selective service laws contributed to our eventual with-
drawal from the Viet Nam [sic] War.'
25
Acts of civil resistance help to penetrate the psychic numb-
ing which facilitates the acceptance and involvement in evil.
These acts also help to preserve the moral integrity of society
and to maintain a hope in the goodness of humankind. Few
122. For a discussion of the weakness of international mechanisms and
institutions protecting human rights, see Lippman, Human Rights Revisited: The
Protection of Human Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 450 (1980). See generally Boyle, supra note 121.
123. See Kittrie, Patriots and Terrorists: Reconciling Human Rights with World
Order, 13 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 291, 295 (1981).
124. See Lippman, The Right of Civil Resistance Under International Law and
the Domestic Necessity Defense, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 349, 371 (1990).
125. Kabat, 797 F.2d at 601.
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would admonish those who engaged in small acts of resistance
to the Nazi regime on the grounds that such acts could not pos-
sibly topple the regime or lead to the rescue, of all Jews.
Although it is unrealistic to expect that a single act of protest
can remedy complex social evil, the historical record suggests
that small acts of "petty resistance," in aggregate, can exert a
profound effect on social attitudes and bring about social
reform. 1
26
Many advanced and seemingly civilized societies have
practiced what, in retrospect, were objectionable social prac-
tices.' 27 Today, it would be difficult to condemn acts of non-
violent, proportionate resistance undertaken by Native-Ameri-
cans forced from their land; Japanese-Americans interned dur-
ing World War II; African-Americans sold into slavery or
denied equal access to facilities; or to a Vietnam veteran who
refused to spray the toxic chemical Agent Orange. In light of
this historical record, Americans would be wise to adopt a tol-
erant attitude towards those compelled to engage in acts of
civil resistance. Today's obscenity may be tomorrow's lyric.
In a humane and democratic society, moral and political
conflict should be resolved through discussion and debate.
Civil resisters are attempting to uphold rather than to deni-
grate the rule of law. It only creates frustration and a sense of
injustice when courts refuse to permit defendants the opportu-
nity to defend their formally criminal behavior to ajury of their
peers. The interests in a narrow application of the standing
and political question doctrines pale when compared to the
threats posed by a nuclear war, genocide and wars of aggres-
sion. The trial of civil resisters should be viewed as an oppor-
tunity to conduct judicial town meetings on the issues of the
day. Such trials can revitalize democracy by countering the
often limited and biased information which is available to the
public.' 28 American courts are not unaccustomed to the dispo-
sition of political cases and controversial examples. In fact,
pursuant to international extradition treaties, the United States
has recognized and courts have refused to extradite violent
political offenders to stand trial abroad. If we can tolerate, and
often celebrate, acts of revolution by those in other countries,
126. On the concept of "petty resistance," see generally Kaufman,
Small Scale Right to Resist, 21 NEw ENG. L. REV. 571, 576 (1985-86).
127. See generally Lippman, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann and the Protection of
Universal Human Rights Under International Law, 5 Hous. J. INr'L L. 1, 31-32
(1982).
128. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 310
(1975).
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certainly we have the capacity to listen to and to fairly evaluate
the justifications offered by civil resisters at home.' 29
IV. LOWERING THE PROCEDURAL BARRIERS: A REVISED
APPROACH TO THE STANDING AND POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINES
Thejudiciary's rigid interpretation of the standing require-
ment under the Nuremberg Principles is reminiscent of the
type of f6rmalistic analysis adopted by American courts to
avoid cases challenging the institution of slavery in the nine-
teenth century.' ° This approach to standing eviscerates the
Nuremberg defense and limits its application to a narrow range
of cases.13 ' There also have been few instances in which prose-
cutors have been willing to affirmatively enforce the Nurem-
berg Principles against government leaders.'1 2  Thus, in
practice, Nuremberg has been rendered a nullity within the
American system of justice. The judiciary, in rejecting
defendants' standing to raise the Nuremberg defense, ignores
the recognized privilege of citizen intervention to prevent the
commission of a crime."13 This privilege is particularly com-
pelling when civil resisters are acting on behalf of those who
find themselves victimized by repressive regimes or terrorist
groups supported by or aligned with the United States. While
such situations are not strictly immediate, they constitute a
severe and ongoing harm which best can be combated through
exerting pressure on the United States government.1
34
129. See Lippman, The Political Offender Exception in International
Extradition Law: Terrorism Versus Human Rights, 13 Irr'L J. COMP. & APPLIED
CRIM. JUST. 45 (1989).
130. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975).
131. The judiciary's strict standing requirement for the Nuremberg
defense necessarily limits the defense to those who directly resist or those
with legal authority who intervene to prevent the commission of a war crime.
It is obvious that few soldiers in the heat of battle are in a practical position to
assert the defense. See generally D'Amato, Gould & Woods, War Crimes and
Vietnam: The "Nuremberg Defense" and the Military Resister, 57 CALIF. L. REV.
1055 (1969).
132. See generally Lippman, The My Lai Massacre and the International Law
of War, in TERRIBLE BEYOND ENDURANCE? THE FOREIGN POLICY OF STATE
TERRORISM 313 (M. Stohl & G.A. Lopez eds. 1988).
133. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
134. See generally Lippman, Disappearances: Towards a Declaration on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 4
CONN. J. INT'L L. 121 (1988); Lippman, Government Sponsored Summary and
Arbitrary Executions, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 401 (1989).
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The judiciary's approach to standing under the Nurem-
berg defense also overlooks the dynamic nature of interna-
tional law and the expansion of international rights and duties
which has occurred over the course of the last forty years.
International law, according to some scholars, has extended
the Nuremberg Principles and now formally recognizes a right
of non-violent, proportionate citizen resistance to the violation
of human rights by states. This right of ideological self-
defense, in part, is based upon the realization that it is ill-con-
ceived to exclusively vest the protection of the inherent human
rights of peoples in the very regimes which often have an inter-
est in circumscribing criticism, dissent, due process and the
provision of social services.1
3 5
The fact that a defendant is subject to criminal prosecution
should guarantee that the defendant faces imminent concrete
injury and has the requisite personal stake in the outcome of
the trial to guarantee the adversarial litigation of the issues. 3 6
While the extension of standing to raise the Nuremberg
defense to civil resisters may appear to invite a rash of criminal
litigation spawned by idealistic crusaders, few will feel morally
compelled to violate the law, expend the time and resources
necessary to present a competent defense, and risk criminal
conviction and punishment. Most will* suppress their moral
qualms and accept even the most draconian government poli-
cies.'" 7 Even if there is large-scale civil resistance, it must be
remembered that civil resisters are not asserting a vague moral
claim to violate the law. Instead, they are altruistically seeking
to enforce a specific legal limitation on the conduct of the gov-
ernment.' l3  In this sense, they are acting as private attorneys
general on behalf of the global community.'
3 9
135. See Lippman, supra note 124.
136. But see Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464,
485-90 (1982).
137. On the tendency of most people to conform to the dictates of
authority figures, see S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN
EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1969). Milgram's research reveals that most people
find it extraordinarily difficult to openly violate authoritative commands. Id.
at 162-64. The psychological literature thoroughly documents that only a
select number of highly empathetic individuals are willing to act in an
altruistic fashion and to absorb the social costs associated with intervening to
remedy a situation of peril. See generally S.P. OLINER & P.M. OLINER, THE
ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY: RESCUERS OF JEWS IN NAZI EUROPE 223-60 (1988).
138. But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
139. An example of the rampant disregard for international law is the
systematic and large-scale use of torture in the world. See generally Lippman,
The Protection of Universal Human Rights: The Problem of Torture, 1 UNIVERSAL
HUM. RTS. 25 (1979) (now titled HUM. RTS. Q.).
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In the author's experience, a great percentage of those
civil resisters who are permitted to offer an international law
defense are acquitted by the jury at the trial court level.' 40 This
suggests that civil resisters, when afforded the opportunity, are
able to convince others of their cause and that courts are not
furthering the interests of justice when they construct proce-
dural barriers to the presentation of the Nuremberg defense.' 4 '
Those concerned with lawlessness best concern themselves
with controlling the rampant crime in the street.
The courts in civil resistance cases, as previously men-
tioned, also have interpreted the political question doctrine in
such a fashion as to render the defendants' claims non-justicia-
ble. This effectively insulates American foreign and military
policies from legal accountability and contributes to the per-
ception that international law is an irrelevant consideration in
the policy-making process. 142 Justice Brennan in Baker v.
Car,'4 3 rejected "sweeping statements to the effect that all
questions touching foreign relations are political questions"
and noted that it was "error to suppose that every case or con-
troversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance."' 144 As Justice Stewart observed in urging the
Supreme Court to relax the political question doctrine and to
determine the legality under international law of the Vietnam
War, these "are large and deeply troubling questions" which
will not "simply go away" merely because the Court chooses to
ignore them. 1
45
The political branches do not possess unlimited discretion
in foreign affairs. The Nuremberg Principles limit the sover-
eign prerogatives of States and a regime's legitimacy rests upon
its respect for human rights and restraint in the use of force.
Professor Jules Lobel observes that governmental actions
which violate either customary international law or multilateral
treaties embodying fundamental norms of international law are
unconstitutional and void. He argues that the latter interna-
tional legal limitations, at a minimum, include actions violative
140. See Boyle, supra note 121, at 352 (concurring in the author's
assertion).
141. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1144 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. See Falk, The Nuremberg Defense in the Pentagon Papers Case, 13 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 208, 214 (1974).
143. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
144. Id. at 211.
145. Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 935 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See also Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972, 973-74 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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of the Nuremberg Principles, such as torture, genocide, the
assassination of foreign leaders and wars of aggression.' 46 In
urging courts to abandon the political question doctrine, Rich-
ard Falks argues that:
There is no longer any justification for the political
question doctrine, which rests on the notion that the judi-
ciary cannot displace Executive discretion. Now that
international law has constrained Executive discretion, it
seems appropriate for courts to administer these con-
straints and, indeed, inappropriate to act as if no such
constraints exist-which is the effect of applying the
political question doctrine to a given situation. . . . To
date, however, courts have been hiding beneath the polit-
ical question cloak without even addressing the substan-
tial question as to whether, in light of shifts in
international law, this mode of defense is any longer
appropriate. 1
47
The acceptance of the Nuremberg defense would not nec-
essarily force courts to abandon completely the political ques-
tion doctrine since courts would not be required to adjudicate
the legality of foreign and military policy decisions. The
defense merely would permit the defendant to offer evidence
and the jury to determine the reasonableness of the defend-
ants' belief that the government policy being challenged is vio-
lative of the Nuremberg Principles. It is ingenuous to argue
that a criminal trial involving the presentation of expert wit-
nesses will interfere with the conduct of American foreign pol-
icy or embarrass the government. A series of acquittals only
may serve the cause of democracy by emphasizing to policy-
makers that their actions may be violative of international law
and at variance with popular sentiments. At any rate, the
notion that the judicial branch should insulate the executive
and legislature from the legal and factual scrutiny of their poli-
cies is contrary to the idea of separation of powers. Democratic
government rests upon an informed and vital citizenry capable
of checking government abuse. This, of necessity, requires a
full flow of information. The judiciary would not be substitut-
ing their views for those of elected officials. It merely would be
performing their constitutional function of legally reviewing
the conduct of the political branches of government. Disregard
for the rule of law by the government is contagious and adher-
146. Lobel, The Limits Of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign
Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1137-38, 1146, 1154 (1985).
147. Falk, supra note 142, at 214.
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The judiciary's application of the standing and political
question doctrines, in combination, results in denying defend-
ants their. constitutionally guaranteed right to present a
Nuremberg defense.' 49 The jury is the conscience of society
and Justice Blackmun has observed that it should be a "rare
occurrence" in criminal cases when a judge rules on a defense
as a matter of law and prevents its submission to the jury.' 50 It
is hypocritical for the United States government, which was
central to the development of the Nuremberg Principles, to
profess to respect and to adhere to international law and then
to summarily convict and punish those who seek to compel the
government to adhere to the rule of law. The judiciary, by ele-
vating procedural detail over the resolution of legal claims, has
become an accomplice to governmental lawlessness abroad and
the repression of those who seek to vindicate human rights at
home. As a result, some of our most idealistic and thoughtful
citizens have become labelled as either lunatics, martyrs or
criminals. It is time to break down the Berlin Wall which insu-
lates courts from the Nuremberg defense and for the judicial
politburo to permit a free marketplace of ideas in the court-
room. Two critics argue for the "open debate of political
issues in the courtroom so that deep matters ofjustice are not
settled on shallow grounds of technical law (concealing sub-
stantive prejudice), and so that human values, beyond simple
acceptance of authority, can begin to determine the decisions
of judges and juries."'1'5 In this way, they conclude that the
courtroom can be used to further "the political education of
the American people."' 52
148. For a comprehensive discussion of the constitutional relationship
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The early common law, appreciating the weakness of gov-
ernmental institutions, authorized citizens to arrest wrongdo-
ers. The international community faces severe threats to global
stability and yet has failed to develop institutions capable of
controlling the self-interested criminal conduct of strong
nation-states. This threat, in part, can begin to be checked by a
vigorous citizenry which, as during the first four to five hun-
dred years of the common law, takes responsibility for policing
its own community and invokes the Nuremberg privilege to
limit governmental abuse.'
5 3
Allegiance to the nation-state must be. replaced by a loyalty
to the human community and by a respect for international law.
It is not the rebel who threatens civilization, but the compliant
conformist who mechanically suppresses his moral qualms
when confronted with the dictates of authority. The famous
therapist R.D. Laing reminds us that the perfectly adjusted
bomber pilot poses a greater threat to the survival of the
human species than does the hospitalized schizophrenic.' 5 4
Laing goes on to note 'that so-called normal individuals have
been responsible for the unnecessary death of perhaps one
hundred million of their fellow human beings in the twentieth
century. 1
5 5
The German philosopher Karl Jaspers, some forty years
ago, reflected on the subject of German guilt: "The essential
point is whether the Nuremberg trial comes to be a link in a
chain of meaningful constructive political acts, or whether by
the yardstick there applied to mankind the very powers now
erecting this Nuremberg trial will in the end be found want-
ing. '  Richard Falk writes that Jaspers' "Nuremberg Prom-
ise" has gone unfulfilled.' 5 7 However, there still remains time
for all of us to transform ourselves into selective conscientious
objectors against illegal assertions of sovereign authority.'5 8 In
this process, we hopefully will revitalize the Nuremberg Princi-
ples, American democracy and ourselves.
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